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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of Case: 
This is an equivalency determination case presenting an issue of statutory interpretation. The 
Idaho Legislature enacted and codified statutory provisions to set forth rules and procedures 
governing the application of the Sex Offender Registry (hereinafter referred to as SOR) to persons 
with convictions that are sexual in nature. This case involves an agency's interpretation and 
application of those rules and procedures that result from the direction of the Idaho legislature to the 
Idaho State Police to promulgate rules about identifying persons who should be required to register 
with the SOR, and implementing and governing the SOR. The Idaho State Police is the agency that 
was granted the authority to regulate the application of the SOR statute. Specifically at issue here 
is the ability of SOR board to issue a final order in a contested case that is based upon the outcome 
of a hearing where the person at issue was not provided notice or the opportunity to be heard before 
the board reached a decision. Also at issue is whether or not the Central Registry is permitted to 
make a redetermination of equivalency after it already did so and only in response to a petitioner's 
petition for release from the requirement to register. 
2. Party Reference: 
The Respondent-Appellee, Idaho Central Sex Registry, Bureau of Criminal Identification, 
is referred to as the Agency or Central Registry for the purposes of this argument. Petitioner-
Appellant Mr. Knox is specifically referred to by name. 
3. Statement of Facts: 
Idaho Code Section 18-8304 requires a person who is convicted in another jurisdiction to 
register as a sex offender in Idaho if the conviction is for a crime that is substantially equivalent to 
offenses set forth in the statute and if the person enters this state to establish residency. On December 
17, 2002, Mr. Knox was convicted in Oregon of one count of Rape in the Third Degree, O.R.S. § 
163.355 and one count of Sexual Abuse in the Second Degree, O.R.S. § 163.425. The Petitioner has 
been fulfilling the requirement to register as a sex offender in the State ofldaho. Upon his relocation 
to Nez Perce County, State of Idaho, Petitioner did dutifully register with the State of Idaho. 
On June 2, 2015, the Petitioner filed a Petition for Release from Registration Requirements 
and Expungement of Record. Two months later, on August 5, 2015, the Idaho State Police Bureau 
of Criminal Identification (hereinafter "Agency") issued an Agency's Finding of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and Final Order Regarding Sex Offender Registration. In its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Final Order, the Agency concluded that the crimes committed by Mr. Knox 
in Oregon were substantially equivalent to those found in I. C. § 18-1508, Lewd Conduct with a 
Minor Child under Sixteen. 
On September 4, 2015, Mr. Knox filed a petition for Judicial Review, pursuant to Idaho Code 
Section 67-5270(3), of the Agency's August 5, 2015 Final Order where an equivalency 
determination was made by it and under the legislative grant of authority provided to the Agency 
under Idaho Code § 18-8304 and Idaho Rule of Administrative Procedure 11.10.03 .12, et seq. Mr. 
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Knox filed the petition for Judicial Review on the basis that the Agency's final order was enacted 
through unlawful procedure and was unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious. In response, the Agency 
filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition for Judicial Review on September 17, 2015. 
A hearing on the Agency's Motion to Dismiss was held on June 21, 2016. After oral 
arguments and supplemental briefing submitted by both Mr. Knox and the Agency, the District 
Court rendered its decision on July 22, 2016 and denied the Agency's Motion to Dismiss based upon 
the Agency's failure to properly effect service of the Final Order to Mr. Knox's counsel as required 
under Idaho Rule of Administrative Procedure 04.11.01.055.04. 
The District Court received briefing on Mr. Knox' Petition for Judicial review and on January 
10, 2017 rendered its written opinion and order affirming the Agency's action. Mr. Knox filed a 
timely appeal. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
A) Whether the District Court erred in finding that the Central Registry was not 
required to provide Mr. Knox any additional due process Prior to its issuance of a Final Order 
because Mr. Knox' was provided due process during the criminal course of proceedings? 
B) Whether the District Court erred in affirming the Central Registry's redetermination 
of equivalency when there was already an equivalency determination made with regard to Mr. Knox' 
Oregon convictions and that initial determination afforded Mr. Knox the ability to petition for 
removal of the requirement to register? 
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STANDARD ON REVIEW 
In general, judicial review of agency proceedings is limited. The Idaho Administrative 
Procedures Act ( hereinafter "IDAPA") governs and outlines the rules governing sex offender 
registry. Specifically, the Rules Governing Sex Offender Registry, 11.10.03, outline that the Central 
Registry's equivalency determination is an agency action as defined by Chapter 52, Title 67, Idaho 
Code. IDAPA 11.10.03.08(c). 
The Idaho Administrative Procedures Act also addresses the judicial review of Agency 
equivalency determinations and specifically states that judicial review of the agency's decision shall 
be made in accordance with Chapter 52, Title 67 ofthe Idaho Code. See, IDAPA l l.10.03.08(c)(i), 
and LC. § 67-5270. Therefore, a court may overturn an agency's decision where its findings, 
inferences, conclusions, or decisions: (a) violate statutory or constitutional provisions; (b) exceed 
the agency's statutory authority; ( c) are made upon unlawful procedure; ( d) are not supported by 
substantial evidence in the record; or ( e) are arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. LC. § 
67-5279(3). Moreover, a court may overturn an agency's decision without a finding of (a) through 
( e) above, when substantial rights of an appellant have been prejudiced. Due process rights are 
"substantial rights" for purposes of the IDAPA provision stating that an "agency action shall be 
affirmed unless substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced." Eddins v. City oj Lewiston, 
150 Idaho 30, 36,244 P.3d 174, 180 (2010). 
The appropriate remedy pursuant to the IDAP A is: " ... if the agency is not affirmed, it shall 
4 
be set aside, in whole or in part and remanded for further proceedings as necessary." Idaho Code 
§67-5279(3 ). 
Appellate review of the District Court's decision requires this court to review the agency 
record "independently of the District Court's decision." Marshall v. Dept. oj Transp, 137 Idaho 337, 
340, 48 P.3d 666, 669 (Ct. App. 2002). 
ARGUMENT 
I. Introduction: 
Mr. Knox respectfully argues that the redetermination of his Oregon convictions should 
have been vacated by the District Court upon judicial review. This argument is based on the fact that 
Mr. Knox was not provided due process prior to the Central Registry's hearing, his conviction was 
not an Idaho conviction, and the Central Registry had already made an equivalency determination 
when Mr. Knox first moved to Idaho in 2003. It was in violation of Mr. Knox's constitutional rights 
for the Central Registry to make a redetermination of equivalency with regards to Mr. Knox's 
Oregon convictions that were already equivalated in 2003. 
The Sex Offender Registry Amendments of 2001, 2009, and 2011 classify registrants based 
upon whether their offense was an "aggravated offense," and determines the length of time that a 
person must register and the frequency of reporting. These Amendments are based solely on the 
offense of conviction, and an offense whose definition is constantly changing. 
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II. Idaho's Sex Offender Registry: 
It is necessary to review the history of Idaho's Sex Offender Registry (hereinafter referred 
to as SOR), as limited to the application to Mr. Knox and the case at bar. Sex offender registration 
in Idaho began on July 1, I993. It established a statutory duty for persons convicted of certain felony 
sex crimes to register with their local sheriff. In 1998, the Legislature repealed the original act and 
enacted the "Sexual Offenders Registration Notification and Community Right-to-Know Act" to 
strengthen program administration and to expand public access to central registry information. The 
1998 statute applied to any person who, on or after July 1, 1993, was convicted of a crime listed in 
Idaho Code Section 18-8304(1 )(a), was incarcerated or on probation or parole on or after July I, I993 
for crimes listed, or entered the State on or after July 1, I993 and who has been convicted of any 
crime that is substantially equivalent to the listed offenses. This statute did not apply to any such 
person while they were incarcerated and a conviction in this chapter meant that the person had pled 
guilty or had been found guilty, notwithstanding the form of the judgment or withheld judgment. The 
1998 statute indicated that any person, other than one designated as a violent sexual predator, may, 
after a period often (10) years from the date the person was released from incarceration or placed 
on parole, supervised release or probation, whichever was greater, petition the District Court for a 
show cause hearing to determine whether the person shall be exempted from the duty to register as 
a sexual offender. The offender was required to provide clear and convincing evidence that he/she 
was not at risk to commit a crime identified in section 18-8304, provide an affidavit indicating that 
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the petitioner did not have a criminal charge pending nor was he/she knowingly under criminal 
investigation for any crime identified in 18-8304, provide proof of service of petition to the 
prosecuting attorney, and provide a certified copy of the judgment of conviction. The 1998 statutes 
set forth that offenders were required to obtain psychosexual evaluations upon conviction as well 
as upon release from incarceration and offenders were required to pay for such evaluations, unless 
indigent. See I.C. Section 18-8318, 1998. 
In 2001, amendments were made to Idaho Code Section 18-8303, 18-8304, 18-8310, and 
18-8323. Specifically, those amendments included, among other things, the removal of petitioning 
rights of offenders who had been convicted of an "aggravated offense." The definition of an 
"aggravated offense" included 18-1508 (lewd conduct, when the victim is less than twelve ( 12) years 
of age); 18-4003( d) (murder committed in the perpetration of rape); 18-6101 (rape, but excluding 
section 18-3101 (1) where the victim is at least twelve (12) years of age or the defendant is eighteen 
(18) years of age or younger); 18-6108 (male rape); and 18-6608 (forcible sexual penetration by use 
of a foreign object. Code Section 18-8323 added that the department may make the sex offender 
registry available to the public via the internet. 
In 2002, amendments were made to Idaho Code Section 18-8303, 18-8312, and 18-8314. 
Specifically, Idaho Code Section 18-8314 was the new reference as to whether an offender was 
considered a violent sexual predator and, in the same section, Idaho Code Section 18-6101 ( 1) ( when 
the offender is eighteen (18) years of age or younger) was excluded from said list. Mr. Knox was 
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convicted in Oregon in the year 2002. He moved to the State of Idaho in 2003. The initial 
equivalency determination was made in 2003 when Mr. Knox moved to Idaho. 
In 2004, amendments were made to Idaho Code Sections 18-8303, 18-8304, 18-8306, 
18-8307, 18-8314, 18-8315, 18-8317, 18-8327, and 18-8328. Specifically, Idaho Code Section 
18-8314(3) was added which stated that the classification board was to review offenders who were 
convicted out of state in order to determine if they are violent sexual predators. Code Section 
18-8317 was amended so that only those sex offenders who were deemed appropriate or review by 
the classification board were subject to a psychosexual evaluation prior to release from incarceration. 
In 2009, amendments were made to Idaho Code Sections 18-8303, 18-8304, 18-8308, and 
18-8310. Those amendments included, among other things, the expansion of the definition of an 
"aggravated offense." Specifically, 18-1508 (lewd conduct, when the victim is less than twelve ( 12) 
years of age) was changed to 18-1508 (lewd conduct). Other sections were added to the list of 
aggravated offenders including 18-l 506A (ritualized abuse of a child), 18-4502 (first-degree 
kidnaping committed for the purpose of rape, committing an infamous crime against nature, 
committing any lewd and lascivious act upon a child under the age of sixteen (16) years or for 
purposes of sexual gratification or arousal), 18-4503 (second degree kidnaping where the victim is 
an unrelated minor child and the kidnaping is committed for the purpose of rape, committing an 
infamous crime against nature, committing any lewd and lascivious act upon any child under the age 
of sixteen (16) years or for the purposes of sexual gratification or arousal), 18-8602( 1) ( sex 
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trafficking), and any other offense set forth in section 18-8304, Idaho Code, if at the time of the 
commission of the offense the victim was below the age of thirteen (13) years. Notably, the term 
"substantially equivalent" was present and applicable at the outset of the legislation in 1998. 
In 2010, amendments were made to Idaho Code Sections 18-8303, 18-8304, 18- 8308, and 
18-8314. Specifically, those amendments included, among other things, 18-8303 where a section of 
the definition of an "aggravated offense" was amended from 18-6108 (male rape) to 18-8108 (male 
rape, but excluding section 18-61 08(1) where the victim is at least twelve ( 12) years of age or the 
defendant is eighteen(l 8) years of age). This change was also made in Code Sections 18-8304 and 
18-8314. 
In 2011, amendments were made to Idaho Code Sections 18-8302, 18-8303, 
18-8304, 18-8305, 18-8306, 18-8307, 18-8308, 18-8309, 18-8310, 18-8311, 18-8312, 18-8314, 18-8315, 
18-8316, 18-8318, 18-8323, 18-8324, and 18-8329. Additionally, 18-8317, 18-8319, 18-8320, 
18-8321, and 18-8322 were repealed. Specifically, 18-8302 was amended to state that the legislature 
finds that sexual offenders present a danger, rather than that they present a significant risk of 
reoffense. Code Section 18-8303 was amended so that an offense that is substantially similar to any 
of the foregoing offenses under the laws of another jurisdiction or military court or the court of 
another country is considered an "aggravated offense." Idaho Code Section 18-8310 was amended 
to state that registration under this act is for life, however, any offender, other than a recidivist, an 
offender who has been convicted of an aggravated offense, or an offender designated as a violent 
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sexual predator, may, after a period often (10) years from the date the offender was released from 
incarceration or placed on parole, supervised release or probation, whichever is greater, petition the 
district court for a show cause hearing to detem 1 ine whether the offender shall be exempted from 
the duty to register as a sexual offender. In the petition, the offender shall provide clear and 
convincing evidence that the petitioner has completed any periods of supervised release, probation 
or parole without revocation, provide an affidavit indicating that the petitioner does not have a 
criminal charge pending or is knowingly under investigation for any crime identified in 18-8304, 
provide clear and convincing evidence that the petitioner has successfully completed a sexual 
offender treatment program, and provide an affidavit demonstrating that the petitioner has no felony 
convictions and has committed no sex offenses during the period of which the petitioner has been 
registered. Idaho Code Section 18-8310(2) gives the prosecuting attorney and central registry the 
opportunity to submit evidence, affidavits, or other documents rebutting the assertions contained 
within the offender's petition. 
The 2011 amendment to Idaho Code Section 18-8312 changed the name of the Sex Offender 
Classification Board to the Sex Offender Management Board. The Board was increased from four 
( 4) to nine (9) members and those members are now eligible for reappointment to the Board without 
limitations. The amendments removed the section stating that the board was to assess the risk of 
reoffense of any offender convicted and incarcerated for commission of a crime that may classify 
them as a violent sexual predator, recidivist, or an aggravated offender. It is now stated that the 
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board shall be charged with the advancement and oversight of sexual offender management policies 
and practices statewide. Also amended in 2011 was Idaho Code Section 18-8314 where the 
amendment removed all duties that involved evaluating and classifying offenders. Instead, they are 
in charge of creating standards and procedures that evaluators have to follow as well as administering 
certifications to evaluators. Idaho Code Section 18-8315 was amended so that the management 
board has no exceptions to the open meeting law and there is no written record of the vote which 
classifies the offender. 
A. The District Court Erred in Finding That the Central Registry Was Not Require 
To Provide Mr. Knox Any Additional Due Process Prior to its Issuance of a Final 
Order That Has the Full Force and Effect of Law Because Mr. Knox' Was Provided 
Due Process During the Criminal Course of Proceedings Where Mr. Knox' Conviction 
Was Not An Idaho Conviction 
1. Mr. Knox Was Not Afforded Due Process. 
Due process is a pillar of our judicial system. Due process of law guarantees no particular 
form of procedure; it protects substantial rights. See, Mitchell v. WT Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600,610, 
94 S.Ct. 1895, 1901, 40 L.Ed.2d 406, 415 (1974). In fact, where a party demonstrates that it's due 
process rights have been violated by an agency's actions, the party has similarly demonstrated that 
a substantial right has been prejudiced for the purpose of Idaho Code Section 67-5270(3). Eddins 
v. City oj Lewiston, 150 Idaho 30, 36, 244 P.3d 174, 180 (2010). It is a fundamental concept that 
even in an administrative law proceeding, people have due process protection and an administrative 
tribunal may not raise issues without first serving the affected party with fair notice and providing 
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him with a full opportunity to meet the issue. Hernandez v. Phillips, 141 Idaho 779, 781, 118 P.3d 
111, 113 (2005); White v. Idaho Forest Indus., 98 Idaho 784,786,572 P.2d 887,889 (1977). In a 
situation where a final order is the resultant agency action, such situation is defined as a "contested 
case." Defined as such, contested cases under Idaho Code § 67-5242 are afforded a procedural 
protection in assuring the adverse party is notified of a statement of the time, place, and nature of the 
hearing; a statement of the legal authority under which the hearing is to be held; and a short and plain 
statement of the matters asserted or the issues involved. As such, notice is rightfully considered to 
be a critical aspect of due process to be afforded in any administrative process. Grindstone Butte 
Mut. Canal Co. v. Idaho Power Co., 98 Idaho 860,865,574 P.2d 902,907 (1978). The essentials 
of due process permit administrative regulation only by adherence to the fundamental principles of 
constitutional government. The legislature must appropriately prescribe standards of administrative 
action. The quasi-judicial action thus prescribed, must faithfully observe the 'rudiments of fair play'. 
A fair and open hearing is the absolute demand of all judicial inquiry. In the field of administrative 
regulation it is not only vital to the validity of the regulation imposed; it is vital 'to the maintenance 
of public confidence in the value and soundness of this important governmental process'. Petition 
oj New England Telephone & Telegraph Co., 136 A.2d 357,362 (Vt.1957)(citingMorgan v. United 
States, 304 U.S. 1, 14, 15, 58 S.Ct. 773, 775, 82 L.Ed. 1129; Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v. Public 
Utilities Commission, 301 U.S. 292,304,305, 57 S.Ct. 724, 81 L.Ed. 1093.) Appurtenant to the 
right to notice is the right to be fairly notified as to the issues to be considered. Grindstone Butte 
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Mut. Canal Co. v. Idaho Power Co., 98 Idaho 860,865,574 P.2d 902,907 (1978). Lastly, under 
Idaho Code § 67-5242(3)(b), at the hearing, the presiding officer shall afford all parties the 
opportunity to respond and present evidence and argument on all issues involved, except as restricted 
by a limited grant of intervention or by a pre-hearing order. 
In the case at bar, the first notification of any action to be undertaken by the Central Registry, 
let alone a completed action, was when Mr. Knox received a copy of the Agency's August 5, 2015 
Final Order in the mail. That is to say, neither Mr. Knox, nor his attorneys of record were ever 
notified of a pending Agency action prior to the issuance of a final order. It was only during the oral 
argument on June 21, 2016 hearing on the Agency's Motion to Dismiss that it is now known that 
Mr. Knox's original Petition for Relief from the registration requirement (filed in Nez Perce County 
Case Number CV 15-0001010), was the triggering event that initiated the Agency's action in this 
matter. Furthermore, the Agency's oral argument also provided new information to Mr. Knox in that 
an the hearing was conducted by the Agency's Equivalency Board (hereinafter "Equivalency 
Board"), which was established in 2012. Yet the administrative procedure that the Equivalency 
Board followed remains unknown. Mr. Knox was precluded from presenting argument and evidence 
in response to the Agency's action. The Agency's Final Order was based upon unlawful procedure 
and violated Mr. Knox's due process rights. Under Eddins v. City of Lewsiton, due process rights 
arc "substantial rights" for purposes of the IDAP A provision stating that an "agency action shall be 
affirmed unless substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced." Eddins v. City of Lewiston, 
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150 Idaho 30, 36,244 P.3d 174,180 (2010). Therefore, because substantial rights of Mr. Knox were 
prejudiced, the Agency's Final Order must be reversed. 
In its written Order, the District Court outlines case law wherein the Idaho Court of Appeals 
determined that the criminal conviction itself provides the offender with the requisite amount of 
due process under the constitution. In Groves v. State, 156 Idaho 552,328 P.3d 532 (Ct. App. 2014), 
the Court reasons that because the duty to register is triggered "solely by the fact of conviction of a 
predicate offense" and because an offender was provided due process to dispute that charge prior to 
his conviction, he is not entitled to additional due process. Id. Relying on the holding in Groves, the 
District Court explains, that Mr. Knox had his chance to challenge the charges and the 
corresponding requirement to register, if any, during the criminal procedure and prior to his 
conviction. And further, that any additional action with regard to those convictions in front of the 
Agency or its Equivalency Board does not manifestly give Mr. Knox any additional due process 
because under Groves, there could be no additional information that the offender could provide the 
Agency that he or she did not already have the opportunity to present during the criminal 
proceedings. However, the Groves and the case cited by it, Smith v. State, 146 Idaho 822,203 P3d 
1221 (2009), involve an Petitioner-offender who was ( 1) convicted of crimes under the Idaho 
criminal statue, as they were (2) duly assigned and charged by the State ofldaho, and where (3) the 
Petitioner-offender was subjected to and provided the required due process under the criminal 
procedures of the State ofldaho. In contrast, Mr. Knox's was (1) convicted of crimes under the 
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State of Oregon's criminal statute and they were (2) duly assigned and charged by the State of 
Oregon. In contrast to the Petitioner-offenders in Groves and State v. Smith, Mr. Knox was not 
subjected to and provided the required due process under the criminal procedures of the State of 
Idaho. The justification that no additional due process is owed to a Petitioner-offender as outlined 
under Groves, cannot be held to the same application to those Petitioner-offenders who were 
convicted of crimes under an entirely different statutory scheme as the one the State of Idaho uses 
and as the one the registration requirements attach to. Instead, Mr. Knox is subject to the 
classification of equivalency as determined by the Equivalency Board to interpret the statutes of the 
State of Oregon and make a determination of which Idaho crime it is equivalent to. Mr. Knox should 
absolutely have been be provided due process rights with regard to the equivalency determination 
made in 2003, as it was even prior to the establishment of the Equivalency Board, but even more 
so in the subsequent equivalency re-determination made by the Equivalency Board in 2015. The 
criminal statutes of Idaho and Oregon are considerably different, which is why an equivalency 
determination was required when Mr. Knox first moved to Idaho in 2003. It cannot be said that Mr. 
Knox was afforded the requisite due process with regard to the equivalency. Mr. Knox was not 
afforded the opportunity to present any information on his behalf to the Board prior to its 
equivalency determination in 2003, or its subsequent equivalency determination in 2015. As such, 
Mr. Knox was extended no due process by the State of Idaho. 
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2. The Statutory Framework for Equivalency Determination in Idaho Presents 
Significant Constitutional Shortcomings. 
An equivalency determination of out-of-state offenses is based on the provisions ofldaho's 
Sexual Offender Registration Notification and Community Right to Know Act (hereinafter referred 
to as "Registration Act"). Offenders convicted of out-of-state offenses that are "substantially 
equivalent" to certain specified Idaho crimes who move to Idaho to establish residency are eligible 
for anequivalency determination. I.C. § l 8-8304(l)(b). Mr. Knox, upon relocating to Idaho in 2003, 
was one of the offenders who required an equivalency determination. While an equivalency 
determination was made in 2003, there is no information with regards to how the determination was 
made. Rather, it was only by looking at Mr. Knox's profile on the Sex Offender Registration website 
that information about the equivalency is gained. Idaho provides a computerized sex offender 
registry that is accessible to the public via the internet complete with photos of all sex offenders, 
along with their personal information including name, address, date of birth, and offense history. I.C. 
§ 18-8323. 
Prior to 2012, there was no Equivalency Board. Prior to 2012, there were no IDAP A rules 
governing the equivalency determination. As such, and even now, there are significant constitutional 
shortcomings in the statutory procedure as a result of the lack of procedural due process afforded an 
offender. "Where a person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what 
the government is doing to him, notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential." Wisconsin v. 
Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433,437, 91 S.Ct. 507, 510, 27 L.Ed.2d 515,519 (1971). "[C]ertainly 
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where the State attaches' a badge of infamy' to the citizen, due process comes into play." Id. (holding 
that state's designation of an individual as "habitual drunkard" attaches a badge of infamy, requiring 
the state to provide due process protections before applying such an unsavory label) (citing Wieman 
v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 191, 73 S.Ct. 215,219, 97 L.Ed. 216,222 (1952)). The Equivalency 
Board is charged with the duty of determining if a person's out-of-jurisdiction conviction is 
substantially equivalent or similar to an Idaho sex related offense, as defined by Idaho's criminal 
Code, for the purposes ofrequiring a person to register in Idaho. IDAPA 11.10.03.08(b). While the 
duty to register as a sex offender is triggered simply by reason of conviction for a specified crime, 
an equivalency determination is based upon a factual determination of conduct, i.e., that the offense 
convicted of in a different jurisdiction is substantially similar to a specific Idaho sex offense. This 
distinguishes Idaho's equivalency determination method from a sex offender registry based solely 
on the fact of conviction of a predicate offense. As to the latter, the United States Supreme Court 
has concluded that sex offender registration laws do not violate the offender's procedural due process 
rights, noting the offender "has already had a procedurally safeguarded opportunity to contest" the 
charge. Conn. Dep'tof Pub. Safetyv. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 7,123 S.Ct. 1160, 1164, 155 L.Ed.2d 98,105 
(2003); see also Doe v. Tandeske, 361 F.3d 594 (9th Cir.2004). 
As to due process, the Idaho Supreme Court has stated: 
"Procedural due process basically requires that a person, whose protected 
rights are being adjudicated, is afforded an opportunity to be heard in a timely 
manner. There must be notice and the opportunity to be heard must occur at a 
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." 
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Ada County Highway Dist. v. Total Success Inv., LLC, 145 Idaho 360,371, 179 P.3d 323,334 (2008) 
(internal quotations omitted) (citing Powers v. Canyon County, 108 Idaho 967, 969, 703 P.2d 1342, 
1344 (1985); Cowan v. Bd. ofComm'rs of Fremont County, 143 Idaho 501,512, 148 P.3d 1247, 
1258 (2006); Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Co. v. Peiper, 133 Idaho 82, 91, 982 P.2d 917, 926 
(1999)). 
In spite of the existence of well-established standards of procedural due process, Idaho's 
statutory scheme for an equivalency determination, as established in 2012, prevents and minimizes, 
at every tum, the possibility that an offender has the constitutionally required notice and opportunity 
to be heard. Prior to the Equivalency Board's hearing, the offender is not notified of the hearing and 
is not notified of the information being relied upon. The offender is not provided notice or 
opportunity to be heard before the Equivalency Board or any other opportunity to be heard prior to 
determination. The offender is given his first opportunity to be heard only if he can persuade the 
district court upon judicial review of the Equivalency Board's decision. In the event that the offender 
clears this threshold hurdle, he then bears the burden of disproving the propriety of the equivalency 
determination. 
3. The Actions of the Legislature in Amending the Sex Offender Registry in 
2009 Represent a Violation of Mr. Knox's Right to Due Process. 
In February 2009, the Idaho Supreme Court in Smith vs. State of Idaho, 146 Idaho 822, ruled 
that "Idaho's statutory scheme for VSP designation minimizes, at every tum, the possibility that an 
offender has the required notice and opportunity to be heard." The Court further stated that "due 
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process requires that the State bears the burden of proving, in some meaningful time, that the 
Defendant deserves the classification assigned." At the time of the Smith decision, a sex offender had 
a right to a due process hearing to determine whether he or she should be put in a class requiring 
VSPs to update their information every ninety (90) days and to remain on the Registry for life. In 
other words, classification as a VSP was based upon a factual determination of probable future 
conduct, i.e., that the offender posed a high risk of committing another offense or engage in 
predatory sexual conduct. 
The Supreme Court in its determination that the defendant had been denied his rights to due 
process stated: 
"The legislature created the Board to 'assess the risk of reoffense of any offender 
convicted and incarcerated for commission of a crime as set forth in section 18-8314, 
Idaho Code, to determine whether the offender should be designated a violent sexual 
predator.' LC. § 18-8312(1). The legislature imposed the duty upon the Board to 
establish objective guidelines to be used in the determination of whether an offender 
should be designated a VSP. 
The board shall establish guidelines to determine whether an offender who meets the 
criteria of this section is a violent sexual predator presenting a high risk ofreoffense. 
The guidelines shall be established with the assistance of sexual offender treatment and 
law enforcement professionals who have, by education, experience or training, 
expertise in the assessment and treatment of sexual offenders. 
(a) Factors to be used in establishment of the guidelines must be supported 
in the sexual offender assessment field as criteria reasonably related to the 
risk of reoffense and be objective criteria that can be gathered in a 
consistent and reliable manner. 
(b) The guidelines shall include, but are not limited to, the following 
general categories for risk assessment: seriousness of the offense, offense 
history, whether the offense was predatory, characteristics of the offender, 
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characteristics of the victim, relationship of the offender to the victim, the 
number of victims and the number of violations of each victim." 
LC. § 18-8314(5). Further, the legislature authorized the Board to promulgate rules to carry out the 
provisions of the Act. I.C. § 18-8314(8). 
The Court further stated: 
"This Court has previously stated that judicial review is turned into a 
supe.rfluous exercise of rubberstamping when the decision of a state board sitting in a 
disciplinary or quasi-judicial position relies on the "expertise," "experience," and 
"collective knowledge" of its members on an "ad hoc basis" rather than declaring and 
applying clearly articulated standards to the cases before it. H & V Eng'g, Inc. v. Idaho 
State Bd. of ProfEng'rs & Land Surveyors, 113 Idaho 646,650,747 P.2d 55, 59 (1988); 
Tuma v. Bd. of Nursing, 100 Idaho 74, 81, 593 P.2d 711, 718 (1979). In Tuma, we 
rejected the Board ofNursing's argument that it need not further define "unprofessional 
conduct" when disciplining a registered nurse. 100 Idaho at 79, 593 P.2d at 716. The 
Board of Nursing unsuccessfully argued that providing a definition was unnecessary 
since that board was composed of experts who were fit and capable in their own right 
to determine the standards of their profession from their personnel knowledge and 
experience. Id. at 81 , 593 P.2d at 718. In H & V, we similarly rejected the Board of 
Engineers' reliance on the knowledge and expertise of its members in rendering a 
disciplinary decision on what constituted professional "misconduct" in the absence of 
a clearly defined standards. 113 Idaho at 650,747 P.2d at 59. Both of these cases noted 
the due process ramifications implicit in a board's failure to avail itself of the 
opportunity to expand upon the legislative grounds under which its determinations are 
based. H & V, 113 Idaho at 651, 74 7 P .2d at 60; Tuma, 100 Idaho at 79, 593 P .2d at 716. 
This is because reliance on "the phantom of unknown standards" robs the opportunity 
for notice. H & V, 113 Idaho at 651, 7 4 7 P .2d at 60. We find the instant case to be 
analogous to Tuma and H & Vand conclude that, in the absence of objective 12 and 
clearly defined guidelines and standards upon which Smith's VSP designation may be 
evaluated, his due process rights could not be protected by the process of judicial 
review." 
The legislature's response to the decision in Smith vs. State of Idaho, within approximately 
four (4) months, was to simply amend SOR by changing the name of the Sexual Offender 
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Classification Board to the Sexual Offender Management Board, and requiring all sexual offenders, 
whether violent or not, to be classified as aggravated offenders, and to be treated exactly as VSPs, 
i.e., to remain on the Registry for life. The original Board was required to establish guidelines to 
determine whether an offender was a violent sexual predator depending on a high risk to reoffend. 
The Guidelines were to be established with the assistance of sexual offender treatment and law 
enforcement professionals who had, by education, experience or training, expertise in the assessment 
and treatment of sexual offenders. By eliminating the Sexual Offender Classification Board and 
replacing it with the Sexual Offender Management Board, with no further classification powers, the 
legislature very cleverly side-stepped the Supreme Court's requirements espoused under Smith vs. 
State and effectively removed any provisions regarding classification by putting all sex offenders in 
the same boat, i.e., to be treated as violent sex offenders for life. 
Essentially, prior to the 2009 amendment to SORA, designation as a VSP resulted in 
consequences beyond requiring the designee to register as a sex offender. Non- VSP Sex offenders 
needed only to update their information and photographs on the registry annually, while VSPs had 
to do it every ninety (90) days. And, non-VSP offenders could petition the court for relief from duty 
to register after a period of ten (10) years, while a VSP had to remain on the registry for life. Thus, 
for an offender at that time, only designation as a VSP resulted in the indelible scarlet letters. 
However, what the legislature did in response to Smith vs. State of Idaho, and as a result of the 2009 
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amendment to SOR, was to simply create a situation where the scarlet letters became indelible to all 
sex offenders, rather than provide the due process required by the Supreme Court. 
There is a legitimate state interest in making an equivalency determination. However, the 
United States Constitution prohibits the state from doing so without affording the offender due 
process. It is Mr. Knox's position that Idaho's statutory scheme violates an offender's right to 
procedural due process by failing to provide notice and an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful 
time and in a meaningful manner prior to the Agency rendering a final action that has the full force 
and effect of law. As such, is a constitutional violation. 
B. The District Court Erred in Affirming The Agency's Redetermination of 
Equivalency When The Redetermination Was Arbitrary and Capricious Because There 
Was Already An Equivalency Determination Made And The Initial Determination 
Allowed Mr. Knox To Petition For Removal Of The Requirement to Register. 
With respect to the equivalency determination made by the Agency under the legislative 
grant of authority provided to it under Idaho Code§ 18-8304(1)(b) and Idaho Rule of Administrative 
Procedure, codified at IDAPA 11.10.03.12 et seq., Mr. Knox's argues that the Agency's final 
order was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. Specifically, that an equivalency 
determination was made with respect to Mr. Knox's Oregon offenses in 2003, and immediately upon 
the notification of petitioner's relocation to Nez Perce County, State of Idaho. The Agency cannot 
now, nearly twelve years later, come back with a redetermination following notification of Mr. 
Knox's petition for relief of the registration requirement. 
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Based upon the argument of the Agency at the June 21, 2016 hearing on the Petition for 
Judicial Review, it is now known that Mr. Knox's original Petition for Relief from the registration 
requirement filed in Nez Perce County Case Number CVl 5-0001010, was the catalyst that initiated 
the Agency's action as accomplished through the hearing conducted by the Agency's Equivalency 
Board (hereinafter "Equivalency Board"). The same oral argument also provided the information 
that the Equivalency Board was established in 2012. The precise administrative procedures that the 
Equivalency Board followed remains unknown. 
At issue here is simply whether or not the Agency can make a redetermination of equivalency 
using the most current statutory language following the 2012 creation of the Equivalency Board to 
an offender who had out of state offenses duly equivalated to Idaho offenses at the time of his 
relocation within the jurisdiction and where the original equivalency was made prior to the creation 
of the Equivalency Board. On December 17, 2002, in the Circuit Court of the State of Oregon for 
the County of Multnomah, under Case No. 02-05-33157, Mr. Knox was convicted of two offenses 
that required his participation in the offender registry program in the State of Oregon. Upon his 
relocation to Nez Perce County, State ofldaho, in 2003, the Mr. Knox did dutifully register with the 
State ofldaho Central Registry as required under Idaho Code § 18-8304(1 )(b ). 
At that time, in 2003, and in conjunction with Idaho Code § 18-8304(1 )( a), the State of 
Idaho determined that the first of Mr. Knox's two convictions in the State of Oregon was equivalent 
to a conviction under Idaho Code§ 18-1508. With regard to Mr. Knox's second of two convictions 
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in the State of Oregon, in 2003 the State ofldaho, pursuant to Idaho Code § 18-8304(1 )(b) and in 
conjunction with Idaho Code § 18-8304(1 )( a), determined that Mr. Knox's second conviction in the 
State of Oregon was equivalent to a conviction under Idaho Code § 18-6101. 
It is especially important to note that neither of the two convictions that required Mr. Knox's 
participation with the offender registry were deemed an 'aggravated offense" as it was defined by 
Idaho Code § 18-8303 in 2003 when the above referenced equivalency determinations were made. 
Specifically, the Oregon conviction that was determined to be equivalent to a conviction under Idaho 
Code § 18-1508 is not an included offense under the controlling definition under Idaho Code § 18-
8303(1 ), where under the statutory language in 2003 was, as follows: 
( 1) "Aggravated offense" means any of the following crimes as set forth in 
section 18-8304, Idaho Code: 18-1508 (lewd conduct, when the victim is less 
than twelve (12) years of age); 18-4003(d) (murder committed in the 
perpetration of rape); 18-6101 (rape, but excluding section 18-6101 (1) where 
the victim is at least twelve ( 12) years of age or the defendant is eighteen ( 18) 
years of age or younger); 18-6108 (male rape); and 18-6608 (forcible sexual 
penetration by use of a foreign object). 
Idaho Code§ 18-8303(1) as of Ch. 194, § 3, 2001 Idaho Sess. Laws 659, 661. 
Also, at the time the 2003 equivalency determination and and under the facts of Mr. Knox's 
Oregon conviction, the equivalency lent itself to the application of the express exclusion as an 
aggravated offense because under subsection § 18-8303( 1) excluded from the definition of 
aggravated offense those convictions under LC. §18-6101(1) where the victim was over 12 years 
of age. Because the victim in Mr. Knox's Oregon convictions was 15 years old, it clearly met the 
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"at least 12 years of age" limitation and therefore fell squarely within this exception to the 
aggravated offense definition. 
Upon review of the Idaho case law, it appears this matter is one of first impression to an 
Idaho court. However, it remains Mr. Knox's position that making a secondary equivalency 
determination was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion where there has been no 
explanation as to why the 2003 equivalency determinations are not controlling. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated herein, Petitioner-Appellant Travis Knox, respectfully requests that 
this Court reverse the findings of the Hearing Officer and remand the matter back to the State with 
instructions to vacate the new equivalency determination of Mr. Knox' Oregon Convictions an 
reinstate the original equivalency determination made in 2003. 
·~ 
DATEDthisrdayofMay, 2017. 
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